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INTRODUCTION: THE SCALE OF STUDENT LOANS AND
THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION
The landscape of higher education in the United States has
shifted greatly in the past few years.  More Americans are enrolling in
college: the short span between 2001 and 2011 saw an increase of 37%
in undergraduate enrollment.1  Correlatively, more Americans are
borrowing from the federal government to finance an education.2
Partly due to higher undergraduate enrollment, a lower percentage of
college graduates report that they are getting jobs that actually re-
quire a college degree.3  This in turn means lower earnings for college
graduates.4  The confluence of these trends has led to more college
graduates, with more debt, who default more on their student loans
due to a lack of lucrative jobs, all of which translates to millions of
struggling borrowers who would be greatly aided by a solution from
the federal government.
Solutions for student loan borrowers have not been as forthcom-
ing as solutions in other areas of consumer finance, such as credit
cards and mortgages, which have been a critical goal of federal and
state governments for decades.  Several notable pieces of legislation,
such as the Federal Truth in Lending Act,5 the Credit CARD Act of
2009,6 and portions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act,7 have sought to provide protections to consum-
ers of credit cards, mortgages, auto loans, and other consumer
finance products.  However, student loans are no less deserving of at-
tention, especially considering that credit cards and auto loans are no
longer the largest source of consumer debt: student loans have sur-
1 Inst. of Educ. Scis., Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed
.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=98 (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
2 SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2013, at 4
(2013), available at http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/student-aid-2013-
full-report.pdf.
3 Brad Plumer, Only 27 Percent of College Grads Have a Job Related to Their Major, WASH.
POST (May 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/
20/only-27-percent-of-college-grads-have-a-job-related-to-their-major/ (discussing that 38%
of graduates state that their job does not require a college degree).
4 Alana Semuels, College-Educated Workers Are Taking Jobs that Don’t Require Degrees, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-college-grads-
20130920story.html (noting that the average starting salary for college graduates has
slipped 13% in the last decade).
5 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012)).
6 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
7 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
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passed both,8 accounting for over $1 trillion.9  Reform of the student
loan market is required immediately: student loans are already in a
state of crisis, with 10% of student loans currently in default,10 repre-
senting over $85 billion in loans,11 a number that has climbed signifi-
cantly since 2010.12
There have been many proposals on the most effective way to fix
student loans going forward.  One proposal is to make student loans
risk based like most other areas of consumer finance, taking into ac-
count the school’s placement record.13  The ultimate aim of risk-
based student loans is to bring the maximum amount lenders will give
for a student attending a particular school in line with the average
employment results for graduates of that school, thereby incentivizing
the selection of more employable courses of study by students.14  This
differs from the status quo, where a certain level of student loan fund-
ing is guaranteed to any student, regardless of creditworthiness,
school, or major choice.15  Other proposals involve penalizing col-
leges with high default rates or low graduation rates by lowering the
ceiling of federal aid allowed to individual schools based on default
rates after graduation,16 which act as a proxy for student employment
outcomes.17
8 Daniel de Vise, Student Loans Surpass Auto, Credit Card Debt, WASH. POST (Mar. 6,
2012, 10:54 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/college-inc/post/student-loans-
surpass-auto-credit-card-debt/2012/03/06/gIQARFQnuR_blog.html.
9 Janet Lorin, Student-Loan Debt Reaches Record $1 Trillion, Report Says, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 22, 2012, 11:17 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-22/student-loan-
debt-reaches-record-1-trillion-u-s-report-says.html.
10 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Default Rates Continue to Rise for Federal Stu-
dent Loans (Sep. 30, 2013), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/default-
rates-continue-rise-federal-student-loans.
11 De Vise, supra note 8. R
12 See Megan McArdle, The High Cost of College, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2010, 10:57
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/09/the-high-cost-of-college/
63445/ (stating that the default rate on student loans in 2010 was 7%).
13 See Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 637
(2013) (proposing risk-based pricing of student loans based on long-term data that
matches schooling records with student loan performance, federal income tax, and Social
Security Administration records).
14 See id. at 529–30 (arguing that risk-based loans would make students more aware of
which majors lead to better employment outcomes, resulting in a more productive
workforce and lower graduate underemployment).
15 Federal Stafford loans are available regardless of creditworthiness.  The current
amount guaranteed ranges from $5,500 to $7,500 for undergraduates and to $20,500 for
graduate students. See Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://stu
dentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).
16 See McArdle, supra note 12 (discussing the impact of penalizing colleges for high R
dropout rates and limiting loan amounts on the loan system).
17 Comprehensive employment data is not available for undergraduate schools.  This
leaves default rates the best measure for student employment outcomes because more stu-
dents in default is a signal for more students that are unable to find a job. See College
Scorecard, COLL. AFFORDABILITY & TRANSPARENCY CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://
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The main issue with these proposals is that they may incentivize
universities to avoid servicing populations that are more prone to de-
fault and dropping out, especially low-income students.18  This poten-
tial problem of discrimination that would occur in a risk-based student
loan regime is worsened by universities having a pretense of admitting
students holistically: schools may consciously not admit low-income or
minority populations and attribute it to a lack of extracurricular activi-
ties, student involvement, or other unquantifiable factors.  Since col-
lege admissions are not based solely on test scores,19 a risk-based
student loan regime would require built-in safeguards in order to pre-
vent potential discrimination by universities, which would have a fi-
nancial disincentive by admitting students who may struggle to
ultimately find jobs.
It is practically inarguable that the federal government must re-
form student loans and the way that they are distributed in some
meaningful way, and risk-based student loans or similar programs
would be a meaningful step in the right direction.  The difficulty with
such far-reaching proposals lies in their chances of implementation
and the likely long wait for reform.  While risk-based student loans
and others proposals may be effective at solving issues surrounding
student loans in the long run, something must be done to address
issues relating to the $1.2 trillion of student loans already in existence,
including the large portion of loans that are in default.20  Eventually
Congress will likely address student loans in a comprehensive way, but
Congress must act now to address those who are already struggling.
This Note examines Income-Based Repayment (IBR), a repay-
ment program that allows borrowers to pay a fixed share of their dis-
cretionary income over twenty-five years instead of the standard ten-
year plan that that has fixed monthly payments designed to fully repay
the loan in 120 installments.21  Part II details the mechanics of IBR
and how it works for most borrowers; explores one of the largest issues
with the program, the one-time tax liability that borrowers face at the
collegecost.ed.gov/scorecard/UniversityProfile.aspx?org=s&id=19045 (last visited Feb. 20,
2015).
18 See McArdle, supra note 12 (noting these issues and other issues, in addition to R
proposing school sanctions as solutions to fix the loan system).
19 See, e.g., We Are Looking For . . . , CORNELL UNIV., COLL. OF ARTS & SCIENCES, http://
as.cornell.edu/admissions/good-candidates.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (stating that ad-
missions looks at “what activities, jobs and interests you have outside the classroom” in
addition to SAT and ACT scores).
20 See Lorin, supra note 9.  Default rates are higher for some schools, with the rate R
being 12.9% for public colleges and 19.1% for for-profit institutions.  Allie Bidwell, Student
Loan Default Rate Drops 7 Percent in One Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 24, 2014, 11:00
AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/24/student-loan-default-rate-de
creases-but-some-question-federal-free-passes.
21 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3) (2012); see also infra text accompanying note 30. R
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end of the repayment period; and then examines the federal govern-
ment’s cost projections for the program and current enrollment rates
in the program.  The one-time tax liability is often a significant liabil-
ity, and borrowers may be unable to pay unless they were saving a
large sum of money for the express purpose of repayment.  Part II.A
analyzes the extensive legislative history surrounding 20 U.S.C.
§ 1098e, the IBR statute, as well as other student loan and taxation
provisions.  Part II.B evaluates current solutions that have been of-
fered to fix this one-time tax liability, and ultimately Parts II.C and
II.D propose a solution to eliminate the large one-time liability with-
out resulting in a vastly increased cost for the federal government.
I
BACKGROUND: INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT AND ISSUES
WITH ITS MECHANICS
A. Existing Solutions to Prevent Default and Allow Repayment
In order to address the problems with current borrowers who are
struggling, Congress has instituted several programs to assist with the
repayment of student loans.  Repayment of student loans defaults to a
standard repayment schedule, which requires the full payment of the
loan in 120 payments or ten years.22  This is a fixed-payment amount,
and it is not adjusted for changes in borrower income.23  Since the
standard repayment amount is the same right after graduation as sev-
eral years after graduation, many borrowers struggle to make pay-
ments at the beginning of their careers.24
To counter this, new repayment programs have been introduced
that are linked to borrower income and increase the repayment time
of the loan.  These programs include IBR25 and Pay As You Earn
(PAYE).26  These programs allow graduates to pay a fixed share of
22 Repayment Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/un
derstand/plans (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
23 See id.
24 Cohort default rates (CDR) measure the number of borrowers who default within a
certain period time.  The Department of Education announced that the national two-year
CDR rose from 9.1% in fiscal year 2010 to 10% in fiscal year 2011 and that the national
three-year CDR rose from 13.4% in 2009 to 14.7% in 2010. See, e.g., Allie Bidwell, Student
Loan Default Rates Rise for Sixth Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 1, 2013, 1:49 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/10/01/student-loan-default-rates-rise-for-
sixth-year (explaining that the number of borrowers defaulting two years into repayment
has increased six years in a row); Press Release, Bill Swindell et al., The Inst. for Coll.
Access & Success, New Data Confirm Troubling Student Loan Default Problems (Sept. 30,
2013), available at http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/CDR_2013_NR.pdf (“More than
600,000 federal student loan borrowers who entered repayment in 2010 defaulted on their
loans by 2012, new federal data show.”).
25 20 U.S.C. § 1098e.
26 Income-Driven Repayment Plans for Federal Student Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July
2014), http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/pay-as-you-earn.pdf.
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their income for a longer period of time than the standard repayment
period.  Under IBR, students that borrowed their first student loan
before 2014 pay 15% of their discretionary income for twenty-five
years, and students that borrow their first loan after January 1, 2014,
pay 10% of their discretionary income for twenty years.27  However,
because the amount of the payment is linked to borrower income and
not the outstanding amount of the loan, part of the loan balance
often remains, which is forgiven at the end of the repayment period.28
In order to ensure that only borrowers that need relief can use the
program, eligibility for IBR students is limited to those that are suffer-
ing from a partial financial hardship, which is determined by a
formula.29
The formula to assess a borrower’s partial financial hardship is a
binary standard: if the amount of the student’s loan payment using
the standard repayment calculation in 20 U.S.C. § 1078(b)(9)(A)(i)
or 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(A) would exceed 15% of the borrower’s
discretionary income, the borrower is eligible for IBR.30  Discretionary
income is defined by the statute as the amount by which the bor-
rower’s adjusted gross income exceeds 150% of the poverty line.31
This formula can be simplified by mathematical representation:
Standard Payment > 0.15(AGI – 1.5 × Poverty Line).32  If that equa-
tion is true, then the borrower has partial financial hardship and is
able to take advantage of IBR.
By way of illustration, assume there is a borrower with $125,000 of
student loan debt, the average for graduates of private law schools.33
This loan would have a $17,262 annual payment under the standard
repayment method, which involves 120 monthly payments.34  The
27 20 U.S.C. § 1098e.
28 See Income-Driven Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-
loans/understand/plans/income-based (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (“Under all three [in-
come-driven repayment] plans, any remaining loan balance is forgiven if [the] federal stu-
dent loans are not fully repaid at the end of the repayment period.”).
29 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(1).
30 Id. § 1098e(a)(3) (defining partial financial hardship).
31 Id. § 1098e(a)(3)(B).
32 As a note, the calculations throughout this Note assume the borrower’s first loan
was distributed before 2014, which means that the 15% rate still applies, instead of the new
lower 10% rate. See Ensuring that Student Loans are Affordable, WHITE HOUSE, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/higher-education/ensuring-that-student-loans-are-af
fordable (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) (explaining the new law limiting IBR plan repayments
to 10% of income).
33 Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Debt of Private Law School Grads Is $125K; It’s Highest at
These Five Schools, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 28 2012, 10:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/average_debt_load_of_private_law_grads_is_125k_these_five_schools_lead_to_m/.
34 This monthly payment is calculated using present figures for interest on Stafford
Loans and Graduate Plus Loans, which are the types of loans most commonly used for
graduate school. See Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://
studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
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Department of Health and Human Services currently has the poverty
line set at $11,490 for an individual and $15,510 for a family of two,
making 150% of the poverty line $17,235 and $23,265, respectively.35
All single borrowers with income less than $132,31536 are qualified to
use IBR.37  The amount for married borrowers will depend on the
spouse’s income.38  While it may be difficult to conceptualize a six-
figure income resulting in partial financial hardship, the correlating
debt load for this hypothetical borrower is also high, and is close to
the maximum amount experts recommend borrowing: no more than
the borrower’s expected first-year salary.39
This example helps to illustrate the importance of the initial prin-
cipal borrowed and is especially demonstrative when paired with a
lower figure: when the principal of the above example is changed to
$26,600, the average amount of student loan debt incurred by under-
graduates that borrow student loans, the point where borrowers be-
come ineligible for IBR is reduced considerably.40  This annual loan
35 Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5,182, 5,183 (Jan. 24,
2013).
36 Calculated using the above formula of Standard Payment > 0.15(AGI – 1.5 × Pov-
erty Line).  The standard annual payment is $17,262, and 150% of the poverty line is
$17,235.  With these figures inserted, the equation becomes 17,262 > 0.15(AGI – 17,235).
When the variable AGI is solved for, it equals $132,315.  Solving for AGI in this context
means finding the threshold where the borrower is no longer able to use IBR.
37 This assumes no above-the-line deductions, such as those that appear in 26 U.S.C.
§ 165.  This calculation also uses the interest rates for federal Stafford Loans when deter-
mining the amount the borrower owes under the standard payment schedule and also
assumes that borrowers are paying origination costs at the time of borrowing instead of
adding them to the loan.  The annual standard payment could be even larger with other
types of loans, such as private student loans, which typically carry higher interest rates and
higher origination fees. See Karen Weise, Why Your Student Loan Interest Rate Is So High,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-04/
why-your-student-loan-interest-rate-is-so-high (“Private loans historically have been more
expensive than federal ones.”).
38 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(d) (2012).  In this way, § 1098e arguably imposes a marriage
penalty in the case of a borrower with significant student loan debt and a spouse with
income but no or little student loan debt.
39 See, e.g., Kim Clark, How Much Money Should I Borrow for College?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (June 9, 2009, 10:51 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/paying-
for-college/articles/2009/06/09/how-much-money-should-i-borrow-for-college (“Another
rule of thumb that experts . . . often suggest: Cap total student debt below the first year’s
expected salary . . . .”); Kathleen Pender, students Should Limit Borrowing, Pay Loans Off
Quickly, SF GATE (May 17, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/arti
cle/students-should-limit-borrowing-pay-loans-off-5486344.php (“Total student loan debt
at graduation should be less than your expected annual starting salary, and ideally a lot
less.” (quoting an expert on financial aid)).
40 MATTHEW REED & DEBBIE COCHRANE, PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT, STUDENT DEBT
AND THE CLASS OF 2011, at 21 (2012), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/
pub/classof2011.pdf.  As an important caveat, that figure only includes the average of
those who borrowed student loan debt, which excludes a significant number of college
students who pay for college through other means, such as parental contributions.
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payment is a much more reasonable $3,672, instead of $17,262.41
This in turn means that borrowers with less than $41,715 of income
will qualify for IBR.42
IBR is of chief importance in order to ensure that students who
pursue careers in public service, such as civil servants, teachers,
prosecutors, and police officers are free to choose these careers over
more lucrative options.43  It also, perhaps more importantly, ensures
that students who overborrowed are able to have productive economic
lives without the constant specter of crushing student loan debt.44
IBR is also effective in ensuring that there are real consequences to
student borrowing without overwhelming the students.  One policy
justification for not forgiving student loans outright is that students
should understand the consequences of borrowing large sums of
money for school, or there would be no incentive for students to bor-
row responsibly.45  IBR and programs like it reach a middle ground by
requiring the repayment of a significant portion of a graduate’s in-
come without making the payment onerous enough to be
unaffordable.
B. The Tax Bomb
While the IBR provision allows graduates to pay back their loans
by paying a manageable percentage of their income, the provision has
a significant shortfall that must be fixed before the first borrowers us-
ing IBR have their loans forgiven in 2034.46  When the borrower’s
loan is forgiven, it is counted as a discharge of indebtedness.47  This
may sound intuitive because the graduate does not have to pay back
the rest of the amount.  Unfortunately, this distinction has a down-
side: a discharge of indebtedness is counted as part of the taxpayer’s
41 This repayment figure is calculated using the Loan Payment Calculator on FinAid,
a resource for information concerning higher education. See Loan Calculator, FINAID,
http://www.finaid.org/calculators/loanpayments.phtml (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
42 This once again assumes that a borrower would have no above-the-line deductions
in reaching the calculation for adjusted gross income.
43 Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 2013), http://
studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgiveness.pdf.
44 See, e.g., REED & COCHRANE, supra note 40, at 16 (noting how high student debt can R
limit one’s ability to “save for a home, a family, retirement, or one’s own children’s
education”).
45 Arguably IBR and programs like it are ineffective at making students aware of the
amount they are borrowing because repayment does not begin until borrowers graduate or
drop out of school when it is too late to make any meaningful changes to their borrowing
decisions.
46 IBR went into effect in 2009, and the program at the time had a twenty-five-year
repayment period before the forgiveness of loans.  This translates into the first borrowers
having their loans forgiven in 2034.  20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7)(B) (2012).
47 See infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
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gross income for the year.48  This translates into a one-time tax liabil-
ity, which for borrowers with high amounts of student debt and low
income can be greater than the median income in the United
States.49
The reason for this one-time tax liability has its roots in federal
income tax law.  Under most circumstances, a taxpayer’s gross income
does not include borrowed amounts, because borrowing money is
linked to an obligation to repay the funds, meaning that the borrower
has not gained any wealth through the transaction.50  This means that
when students take out loans for education, those amounts do not
need to be reported as income.51  However, when a loan is forgiven,
this corresponding obligation to repay is removed, meaning that the
borrower has an acquisition of wealth equal to the amount of the
loan.52  The provision of the Internal Revenue Code that concerns the
discharge of indebtedness53 exempts the discharge of student loans
under specific programs from gross income, most notably exempting
public sector loan forgiveness programs.54  However, there is no blan-
ket exemption for the discharge of student loans, meaning that for
most borrowers when the loan is forgiven, the balance will be counted
as income for the taxable year.55
Including discharged indebtedness in gross income makes con-
ceptual sense in the case of purchase of tangible property.  For exam-
48 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012).
49 Ron Lieber, For Student Borrowers, Relief Now May Mean a Big Tax Bill Later, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/your-money/for-student-
borrowers-a-tax-time-bomb.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  The Census Bureau estimates that
the median household income in the United States was $51,939 in 2013. See CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
2013, at 5 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publi
cations/2014/demo/p60-249.pdf.  Depending on student borrowing levels and income,
the one-time tax liability could easily exceed this amount.  For specific calculations of this
one-time liability, see infra Part II.D.
50 While the rule that borrowed amounts do not count as gross income is not codified
in the Internal Revenue Code, it was established in the seminal case of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 426 (1955) (giving the definition of
gross income as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion,” which loans do not qualify for because the taxpayer does not have
complete dominion over the funds).
51 Id.
52 See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (stating that discharge from indebtedness is counted as
gross income in certain circumstances).
53 Stephen J. Dunn, Discharge of Indebtedness Income?  Really?, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2012,
2:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephendunn/2012/02/18/discharge-of-indebted
ness-income-really-2/.
54 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4).
55 See id. § 108(f)(1) (stating that the discharged amount is only excluded “if such
discharge was pursuant to a provision of such loan under which all or part of the indebted-
ness of the individual would be discharged if the individual worked for a certain period of
time in certain professions for any of a broad class of employers”).
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ple, if a borrower negotiates with creditors to settle $4,000 of credit
card debt for $1,000, they will have $3,000 of discharge from indebt-
edness income.56  Presumably, the taxpayer purchased goods and ser-
vices with that $4,000 that they consumed or held, giving stronger
support to the notion that the taxpayer has benefitted by an amount
equal to the forgiveness.  The taxpayer received $4,000 of goods for
$1,000, meaning that the taxpayer had an accession to wealth of
$3,000.57
This is a critical difference from discharge of indebtedness in the
higher education context.  Educational credentials are intangible, and
their true values have the propensity to be far out of line with their
cost because the market for education is distorted by the availability of
non-risk-based, near-unlimited credit and the nebulous value proposi-
tion of higher education.58  This casts doubt that the amount that will
56 There will be discharge from indebtedness income unless the forgiveness takes
place in the context of bankruptcy. See id. § 108(a)(1)(B).
57 Cf. Ray Martin, Cancellation of Debt Income: How to Exclude from Gross Income, CBS
NEWS, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cancellation-of-debt-income-how-to-exclude-from-
gross-income/ (last updated Apr. 5, 2011, 9:30 AM) (explaining the mechanics of dis-
charge of indebtedness in a similar case of a credit card settlement).
58 Compare AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, UNIVER-
SITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2013 GRADUATES (2013), available
at http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (last updated Mar. 17, 2014, 2:36
PM) (select “University of California – Berkeley” and “2013” from the “Individual School
Summary Reports” section) (stating that 82.5% of 2013 graduates were employed long
term in firms of over one hundred lawyers, federal clerkships, public interest, or govern-
ment), with AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, CHAPMAN
UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2013 GRADUATES  (2013), available at http://employ
mentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (select “Chapman University” and “2013” from the
“Individual School Summary Reports” section) (stating that 12.9% of 2013 graduates were
employed long term in firms of over one hundred lawyers, federal clerkships, public inter-
est, or government).  These are the categories of jobs that either allow borrowers to earn
salaries that they can use to repay large student loan obligations or are eligible for public
sector loan forgiveness programs.  This measure is imperfect, however.  There are some
small law firms that pay enough for students to service large debt loads, and some of the
public interest or government jobs may be university-funded positions that qualify as “Full
Time, Long Term” employment based on how the ABA defines the category. See New Re-
search on Law School Funded Positions for Law School Graduates, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACE-
MENT (Sept. 2012), http://www.nalp.org/sept12research_lsfunded (stating that in the class
of 2011 almost 5% of jobs were funded by the graduate’s law school). Despite this, the
ABA data represents the best available proxy for what represents a good outcome from law
school.  Given the significantly better outcomes from Berkeley, if the economy for higher
education worked efficiently, the cost of a school like Chapman would be considerably less.
However, this is not true. Compare University of California - Berkeley Profile, LAW SCHOOL
TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lstscorereports.com/schools/berkeley/costs/2013/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 19, 2015) (stating that the nondiscounted cost of a degree is $296,910), with Chap-
man University Profile, LAW SCHOOL TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lstscorereports.com/
schools/chapman/costs/2013/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (stating that the nondiscounted
cost of a degree is $279,419).  This information demonstrates the asymmetry in the value
proposition of education by school, furthering the argument that the price of the intangi-
ble asset that will be forgiven does not reflect the actual value that the borrower has re-
ceived, making the application of 26 U.S.C. § 108 less rational than in the tangible goods
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be counted as gross income at the time of forgiveness will be in line
with the long-run, difficult-to-estimate benefits received for many stu-
dent loan borrowers, such as career advancement or additional sal-
ary.59  Moreover, in the tangible goods context, such as with an auto
loan settlement or credit card settlement, the taxpayer can sell these
goods in order to address a potential cash shortfall when the tax liabil-
ity that results from the forgiven amount is counted as part of the
borrower’s gross income, which cannot be done with a human capital
product like education.60
Consumers can also more easily assess the relationship between
the quality of a tangible asset and its price and do not automatically
believe that higher-priced goods are of higher quality.61  This differs
from education, which is a difficult commodity to evaluate, even for
experts.62  The value of education is further clouded by a constant
stream of articles and marketing that encourage consumers to pursue
higher education, which likely leads to an overvaluing of the benefit
of higher education by consumers.63  As a result of these differences
between tangible goods and intangible goods like higher education,
the logic behind 26 U.S.C. § 108 is dubious for users of IBR.  The
context.  In this particular case, the cost is nearly the same for the two educational institu-
tions, but employment figures suggest that there is a cavernous difference between the two,
and there is no mechanism in 26 U.S.C. § 108 to take this into account.  The two “prod-
ucts,” in this case degrees, are worth vastly different amounts even though they cost nearly
the same.
59 To illustrate in the undergraduate degree context, a liberal arts degree at most
schools is the same price as a business degree, even though the two have asymmetric out-
comes.  From a purely economic perspective, it seems impossible that the two could truly
be worth the same amount. See infra note 168 and accompanying text (stating the average R
starting salary of a business degree holder is $55,635, compared with $37,791 for the hu-
manities and social science).
60 Consumers may purchase goods that are worth well less than the purchase amount,
or interest or finance charges may make up a significant portion of the debt that is ulti-
mately forgiven.  Despite this, consumers of tangible goods still have an advantage over the
consumers of education, who receive no tangible assets in return for the additional gross
income that accompanies the discharge of indebtedness.
61 See, e.g., Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A
Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence, J. MARKETING, July 1988, at 10–13 (stating that
many different studies that have examined the link between consumer perception of qual-
ity and price have not found definite links, meaning that consumers do not automatically
believe that higher-cost goods are higher quality and, thus, are likely to make better buying
decisions regarding tangible goods).
62 See, e.g., Melissa Korn, Is an M.B.A. Worth it?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904060604576574963215607744 (dis-
cussing the problems with assessing the value of an MBA).
63 See, e.g., Robert Pearigen, Cost and Value in Higher Education, MILLSAPS COLL., http:/
/www.millsaps.edu/about_millsaps/cost_and_value_in_higher_education_pearigen.php
(last visited Jan. 17, 2015) (representing the typical value proposition of higher education
that colleges publish to perspective students).  This is not to say that higher education is
unimportant; indeed, it is critical in today’s economic climate.  However, the notion that
the pursuit of higher education at any cost is per se a wise decision is seriously misguided.
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notion that student loan borrowers are truly benefitting from their
higher education in the amount of the balance left after twenty-five
years of payment and capitalization on a student loan is troubled, and
Congress needs to refine the mechanics of the statute.
The one-time tax liability in 20 U.S.C. § 1098e does not appear to
be a provision purposely designed for IBR but rather a consequence
of applying long-standing tax law to the mechanics of the program.64
The examination of the one-time tax liability is especially vital because
it does not appear to be the result of calculated planning but rather
the passive outcome of applying old law to a new program.  This provi-
sion in § 1098e has been referred to in the popular media as a “tax
bomb,” since it has the potential to cause significant financial harm to
unassuming borrowers.65  This liability supplements the 300 monthly
payments that a student loan borrower has already paid by the time of
“forgiveness.”
A borrower goes from paying no additional income tax for their
student loans to paying one large liability in a single year, requiring
well-thought-out financial planning by borrowers in the years leading
up to forgiveness.  If the borrowers cannot pay back this potentially
substantial tax immediately, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
the authority to levy additional fines, thus further increasing the cost
of education.66  As one commentator dryly noted, “[t]he Internal Rev-
enue Service, alas, does not have an income-based repayment
program.”67
There are several reasons why there may not be popular demand
for changing the mechanics of IBR.  First, IBR is a relatively new provi-
sion.68  There have yet to be any students that have had their loans
forgiven at the end of the repayment period, which means that there
have not been any correlating tax bombs.  Once these start to occur,
there will presumably be more popular demand to fix the problem,
but lack of awareness is the critical issue today.  Second, despite the
program being in place for several years, a significant percentage of
students still are not taking advantage of IBR, despite continued
growth.69  There may not be enough graduates using IBR to make
finding a solution a congressional priority.  Third, even if Congress is
aware of the problem, they may not have yet developed an adequate
64 See infra Part II.A.
65 Lieber, supra note 49. R
66 Topic 653 – IRS Notices and Bills, Penalties and Interest Charges, IRS, http://www.irs
.gov/taxtopics/tc653.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
67 Lieber, supra note 49. R
68 College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007).
69 Tamar Lewin, U.S. to Contact Borrowers with New Options for Repaying Student Loans,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/education/us-to-con
tact-borrowers-with-new-options-for-repaying-student-loans.html?_r=0.
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alternative to the current mechanics of IBR, including the tax time
bomb.
Simply forgiving the loans without the tax consequences would
be seen as problematic.  The federal government stands to lose a large
amount of money through loan forgiveness, and wholesale loan for-
giveness at the end of the repayment period results in potentially sig-
nificant forgone revenue, increasing the cost of IBR.  The tax bomb
could also be an incentive for students to avoid committing to student
loan debt that they will later be unable to repay.  In other words, it is
possible that Congress has not discovered an alternative that main-
tains borrower “skin in the game” while still allowing for an equitable
outcome for the borrower at the end of the repayment period.
C. Current Cost Projections and Enrollment Data in IBR
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) admits that the pro-
gram will result in significant federal costs: $1.8 billion from 2008 to
2017.70  In arriving at this cost estimate, a House Report by the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor before the legislation went into effect
estimated that costs would be kept down by low student participation
“because of the required capitalization of interest and the seeming
reluctance of borrowers to apply for similar relief elsewhere . . . .”71
For the first few years after IBR went into effect, it seemed that the
CBO was correct.  In 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York esti-
mated that only 630,000 borrowers were enrolled in IBR, while more
than 5 million had at least one loan past due.72  These 5 million bor-
rowers fit the exact profile of those that ought to be on IBR.73
However, enrollment figures have changed significantly since the
2012 report.  One year later, 1.6 million borrowers are using income-
linked debt-relief programs, including IBR.74  The amount of borrow-
ers using IBR and other similar programs is just poised to grow: the
Department of Education is taking steps to address the lack of aware-
ness of IBR by both contacting borrowers that are unable to repay
their student loans on the current payment plan and informing grad-
uates of options to pay their loans.75  The federal government has pri-
oritized spreading the word about IBR in other ways as well; the White
70 H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 71 (2007).
71 Id.
72 Kayla Webley, Why Have So Few Student-Loan Borrowers Taken Advantage of Income-
Based Repayment?, TIME (June 12, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/06/12/why-have-
so-few-student-loan-borrowers-have-taken-advantage-of-income-based-repayment/.
73 See id.
74 Lewin, supra note 69. R
75 See id.
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House,76 the Department of Education,77 and even the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau78 have released information about IBR
on their respective websites to encourage additional enrollment in the
program.  As initially identified by the Committee on Education and
Labor report, there is currently “seeming reluctance” of struggling
borrowers to enter the program,79 though proactive government mar-
keting may mitigate this and lead to additional enrollment.  As more
borrowers enroll in these programs, the federal government may
spend billions more than Congress originally expected.
More importantly, the true crisis has not yet come.  Graduates
could not use IBR until 2009, meaning that the first wave of student
loan forgiveness will not come until 2034.80  The federal government
stands to lose a significant amount of money when it begins to forgive
loans.  Even though the federal government stands to recoup a por-
tion of the loans from the one-time tax liability, the government will
end up writing off significantly more through loan forgiveness.81  The
Office of Management and Budget estimates that the average student
loan balance of an IBR user is $39,500, which after payments for
twenty-five years will leave behind $41,000 to be forgiven.82  The cost
that forgiveness will eventually create is not included in the initial
cost-projection numbers, which only stretch to 2021, before the first
wave of forgiveness will occur in 2034.83
The report estimates that the average tax liability for the bor-
rower for this discharge from indebtedness may be over $10,000,
depending on the borrower’s tax bracket.84  Since the average loan
balance at time of forgiveness is projected to be $41,000, even with the
tax collection from borrowers, the federal government stands to lose
close to $30,000 on each individual borrower who uses loan forgive-
ness.85  When this loss is extrapolated over the millions of borrowers
76 Megan Slack, Income Based Repayment: Everything You Need to Know, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (June 7, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/07/
income-based-repayment-everything-you-need-know.
77 Income-Driven Plans, supra note 28. R
78 What is Income-Based Repayment (IBR)?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/633/what-income-based-repayment-ibr.html (last updated
June 17, 2013).
79 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 71 (2007) (identifying borrower reluctance to enter
into similar programs).
80 See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7)(B) (2012) (specifying a twenty-five-year repayment pe-
riod before forgiveness for borrowers who received their first loan before July 1, 2014).
81 See Lieber, supra note 49. R
82 See id. (discussing projected estimates from 2012 through 2021).  It is especially
important to note that the projected amount to be forgiven will actually exceed the initial
amount borrowed, even after 300 monthly payments.
83 Cf. id. (explaining projections based on data through 2021).
84 See id.
85 See id. The federal government obviously recoups part of the loan balance through
twenty-five years of payment, but that amount often only covers interest or part of the
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who will use IBR, the income shortfall for the federal government will
well exceed the initial cost estimates, which relied on projected non-
participation by borrowers.86  Despite the potentially dire conse-
quences of inaction, Congress has not changed the mechanics of IBR,
perhaps due to the far-off nature of the one-time tax liability for
borrowers.  The Office of Management and Budget figures also
demonstrate the problem of continued interest capitalization during
the repayment period.  At the current student loan interest rate, the
forgiven amount often exceeds the initial loan principal.87
II
ANALYSIS
A. Legislative History of § 1098e
IBR came into existence as part of the College Cost Reduction
and Access Act.88  This act includes several other notable provisions,
including an additional public sector loan forgiveness program that
forgives loans after ten years in public service, reduced interest rates
for certain undergraduate loans, student loan deferment for members
of the armed forces, and other similar programs.89  This public service
loan forgiveness program can be combined with IBR, so that a bor-
rower can pay 15% of his or her discretionary income under IBR and
have the remainder of the balance forgiven in ten years instead of
twenty-five years.90
In available legislative history of the College Cost Reduction and
Access Act, Congress seems to be aware that a one-time tax liability will
occur, but it is never explicitly discussed.  One House Conference Re-
port states that “[u]nder [IBR], unpaid interest and principal are cap-
italized and any outstanding loan balance is forgiven after twenty years
of repayment.”91  This suggests that Congress is aware of the two ma-
jor issues with IBR: that the interest continues to capitalize, which re-
sults in a larger amount that is forgiven, and that a discharge of
indebtedness occurs at the end of the payment period.92  However,
interest, leading to a loss when the capitalized interest is considered.  Even if most of the
initial principal is recovered, the government has still lost the use of that capital for twenty-
five years.
86 The flaw of the cost estimates is the assumption that not many students would sign
up for IBR.  The combination of borrower-student awareness and lower-than-expected em-
ployment prospects for college graduates will likely result in millions more using IBR. See
Plumer, supra note 3; Semuels, supra note 4. R
87 See Lieber, supra note 49. R
88 Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007).
89 See id.
90 Income-Driven Plans, supra note 28.
91 H.R. REP. NO. 110-317, at 44 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
92 See id.
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there is no further discussion of the consequences of IBR in that
report.
There is a voluminous legislative history record of IBR and the
other provisions of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act.  In
one of the first Senate floor debates for the act, IBR is discussed
briefly, but the focus is mainly on pairing it with public service loan
forgiveness: “[o]ur income-based repayment plan . . . when it’s com-
bined with our public service loan forgiveness plan, the help we’ll pro-
vide to students will be truly remarkable.”93  The speech then goes on
to exclusively discuss the impact on public sector employees, includ-
ing teachers, members of the armed services, legal aid lawyers, and
social workers.94  Throughout the speeches, IBR is exclusively men-
tioned in conjunction with the public sector loan forgiveness program
or the discussions of public sector workers.95  While the focus on pub-
lic sector employees is admirable, it completely ignores the mechanics
of IBR for graduates that are using IBR because they are struggling in
the private sector or unable to secure any meaningful employment.
This exclusive focus on how IBR works in conjunction with public
sector loan forgiveness continues in other House and Senate debates
and reports.  In a House floor proceeding, the chairman of the com-
mittee that was in charge of the legislation, the Education and Labor
Committee, states that under IBR, graduates “will not be required to
pay any more than 15 percent of their income . . .  That means they
can start a career in nursing, in health care, in law enforcement, as a
first responder, and they know that if they stay in that field for ten
years, that loan will be forgiven.”96  A House speech from a few days
later states that IBR is needed because “too many student[s] inter-
ested in public service careers cannot pursue them because of the
debt to salary ratio after graduation.”97  Another House report by the
chair of the committee states that IBR “serve[s] to expand rather than
restrict educational and economic opportunities for graduates who
would otherwise be unable to afford to work as teachers or social
workers.”98
It is difficult to see this focus on public sector loan forgiveness as
anything but myopic, as it ignores the more severe structural
problems lurking within § 1098e.  The program works much better
for public sector employees because the balance after ten years that is
forgiven is expressly not included in the borrower’s gross income.99
93 153 CONG. REC. 11,260 (2007).
94 See id. at 11,260–63.
95 See id. at 11,241–63.
96 153 CONG. REC. 10,256 (2007).
97 153 CONG. REC. 1847 (2007).
98 H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 44 (2007).
99 26 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (2012).
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There is no similar concession for borrowers working in the private
sector, which will be the vast majority of borrowers.100  The same re-
port notes that under IBR, “unpaid interest and principal are capital-
ized.”101  However, the report fails to analyze the consequences of this
fact.  Capitalizing interest and principal over twenty-five years at cur-
rent interest rates can often make the loan balance larger at the time
of forgiveness than the initial balance of the loan, despite twenty-five
years of payments.102
There were also several proposed amendments and changes to
§ 1098e.103  One member of a House committee attempted to elimi-
nate IBR from the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, but he
failed.104  This could be seen as a ratification of House support for
IBR.  Congress also further modified § 1098e after the law was en-
acted.  A provision of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 changed the mechanics of IBR for borrowers that took out
their first student loan after July 1, 2014.105  After the change, these
first-time borrowers have had their repayment period under IBR
shortened from twenty-five years to twenty years, and the standard for
having partial financial hardship, and hence qualifying for IBR, was
cut from 15% to 10% of discretionary income.106  These actions are
an even more decisive show of support by Congress and are further
evidence of Congress’s recognition of the current crisis in student
loans.  However, the legislative history of the Health Care and Educa-
tion Reconciliation Act still does not include any detailed analysis of
the tax bomb and its consequences for borrowers.107
More recent legislative history not only continues the trend of
apparent nonawareness of the tax bomb but also considers reducing
the benefit of IBR to borrowers.  In a House committee report accom-
panying his proposed 2014 budget, Congressman Paul Ryan suggested
changing the classification of partial financial hardship back to 15%
of discretionary income, which was reduced to 10% in 2010 to help
struggling graduates who made enough to not qualify for IBR but not
100 See Catherine Rampell, More College Graduates Take Public Service Jobs, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/business/02graduates.html?page
wanted=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1385002087-zkgqFXzMtgbZVCfDirmd9w (discussing that,
while more graduates are taking public sector jobs, most graduates are still pursuing pri-
vate sector jobs).
101 H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 54.
102 Cf. Lieber, supra note 49 (demonstrating instances where an individual’s repay- R
ment value becomes more than the principal balance due to low payments attributed to
the income-based repayment plan).
103 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-224 (2007).
104 See id. at 3 (motion of Representative Diaz-Balart).
105 Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1081 (2010).
106 Id.
107 See 124 Stat. 1029.
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enough to comfortably service their student loan debt on the standard
plan.108  This was partially motivated by “concerns that the expansions
[of IBR] could disproportionately benefit graduate and professional
students.”109  While the income ceiling borrowers must have to qualify
for IBR is relatively high,110 this argument assumes that borrowers will
want to be on IBR when they could otherwise afford the standard re-
payment plan, even if it costs more than 10% of their discretionary
income, a proposition that is very difficult to support.111  It is also pos-
sible that this argument is not representative of the current political
climate surrounding student loans, and no amendment to IBR has
been made.112
Overall, the dearth of legislative history surrounding the tax
bomb is surprising, given the potential damage it presents to many
taxpayers.  Available legislative history demonstrates that members of
the Education and Labor Committee were aware that interest would
capitalize and that the amount that will be forgiven will be counted as
gross income in the final year of repayment.113  However, the lack of
analysis after this acknowledgement suggests that the committee was
either not aware of the problems that this would create for borrowers
or that the committee saw no alternative to the mechanics of IBR in
the College Cost Reduction and Access Act.  Instead, Congress fo-
cused unblinkingly on public service loan forgiveness and all the grad-
uates who will become police officers, prosecutors, and social workers
because of the bill.114  Meanwhile, the record is devoid of significant
concern for the ever-increasing percentage of loan holders who work
in the private sector who are defaulting.115  Of course, available legis-
lative history does not tell the whole story, instead only allowing a
glimpse of congressional thought through officially available commit-
tee reports and speeches.  While not complete, this snapshot still sug-
gests a lack of congressional awareness, at the time IBR was initially
put into place, of the issues facing borrowers.
108 H.R. REP. NO. 113-17, at 83 (2013).
109 Id.
110 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (calculating that the average private R
law school graduate must make more than $132,315 in order to lose eligibility for IBR).
111 Graduates that are on IBR face difficulty getting approved for other loans, includ-
ing mortgages, auto loans, and other installment loans.  It is doubtful that many borrowers
would put themselves in such a precarious financial situation unless they had no
alternatives.
112 See Ezra Klein, Paul Ryan’s Budget: Social Engineering with a Side of Deficit Reduction,
WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2013/03/12/paul-ryans-budget-isnt-about-the-deficit/ (calling the ideas that underlie the
Ryan budget to be “deeply unpopular, and considered quite radical,” even by fellow
Republicans).
113 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-317, at 44 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
114 H.R. REP. NO. 110-210, at 36 (2007).
115 See McArdle, supra note 12 (noting that the current rate of default is 7%). R
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B. Proposed Solutions for 20 U.S.C. § 1098e’s Tax Bomb
It may seem as though there is no politically viable solution for
the problems of IBR.  After all, the tax bomb does some good for the
Treasury by recouping part of the amount that is forgiven by the fed-
eral government.  There are existing proposals to address the issue.
Representative Sander Levin of Michigan introduced a bill to the
House Ways and Means Committee116 that excludes the taxation of
loan discharges from IBR by amending the tax code.117  The relevant
provision of the tax code, 26 U.S.C. § 108(f), already excludes certain
types of student loan forgiveness from inclusion in gross income, in-
cluding public service loan forgiveness as part of the College Cost Re-
duction and Access Act118 and teacher loan forgiveness under the
Higher Education Act of 1965.119
However, nothing was done with Representative Levin’s legisla-
tion after being introduced to the committee in 2009.120  The reason
may be the cost: allowing the loans to be forgiven wholesale would not
allow the IRS to recapture any amount of the student loan at the end
of the repayment period, which may be on average more than the
initial balance of the loan.121  Given that some members of Congress
wanted to eliminate IBR entirely due to cost concerns,122 the recovery
of some revenue is likely a requirement for the continued existence of
the program.
A more radical proposal is to allow student loans to be discharge-
able in bankruptcy, bringing student loans in line with other forms of
consumer debt.  This would eliminate the tax bomb because the tax
code already excludes discharges of indebtedness resulting from a
bankruptcy proceeding from a taxpayer’s gross income.123  The prob-
lem with this proposal is the vast revenue the federal government
would have to forgo, especially because this solution covers all loans,
not just those that are being repaid via IBR.
This would be a stark departure from current bankruptcy law
concerning student loans.124  In most jurisdictions, borrowers can
only discharge student loans in bankruptcy with a showing of undue
116 H.R. 2492, 111th Cong. (2009).
117 This is done by an amendment of 26 U.S.C. § 108(f) (2012).
118 Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 800 (2007).
119 Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 465, 79 Stat. 1219, 1253 (1965).
120 H.R. 2492 (stating legislation died in previous session).
121 See Lieber, supra note 49 (discussing that Office of Management and Budget esti- R
mates project that the average loan amount that will be included is $41,000 even though
the average initial balance was $39,500).
122 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-224, at 3 (2007) (motion of Representative Diaz-Balart).
123 26 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2012).
124 See, e.g., Equal Justice Works, Bankruptcy Case Offers Hope for Student Borrowers, THE
STUDENT LOAN RANGER, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 12, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www
.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2013/06/12/bankruptcy-case-offers-
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hardship, established in the foundational case of Brunner v. New York
State Higher Education Services Corp.125 Brunner gives a three-part test to
determine if the borrower is suffering undue hardship and is there-
fore eligible for discharge of student loans in bankruptcy: the debtor
must not be able to maintain a minimal standard of living, that mini-
mal standard of living must be likely to persist, and the debtor must
make good faith efforts to repay the loan.126  This standard has been
accepted by nine U.S. courts of appeals.127  Any solution making stu-
dent loans dischargeable in bankruptcy on a wide scale would require
Congress to direct courts to abandon the undue hardship standard,
which is currently very lender friendly.128
While many have suggested allowing student loans to be dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy,129 Daniel A. Austin suggests an innovative
and thoughtful approach.130  Under his proposal, bankruptcy courts
would evaluate the fair market value of a borrower’s loans.131  Fair
market value is defined as the amount that an “investor would pay to
purchase the respective student loan obligation.”132  After evaluating
the fair market value of the student loan, this amount is nondischarge-
able by the borrower.133  The excess of the loan balance above that
amount is then forgiven in bankruptcy.134  In order for this solution to
be effective, federal courts would have to change their standard in
allowing discharge of indebtedness, or, alternatively, Congress would
have to amend the Bankruptcy Code to direct courts to change their
standard.
This proposal would allow the federal government to still recover
a component of the loans due while not overburdening borrowers.
However, a reform on a scale that deals with student loans in a whole-
hope-for-student-borrowers (explaining the difficulty of getting student loans discharged
in bankruptcy and focusing on a notable case where discharge was actually allowed).
125 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
126 Id.
127 Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 373 (2013).
128 See Natalie Kitroeff, Loan Monitor Is Accused of Ruthless Tactics on Student Debt, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/us/loan-monitor-is-accused-
of-ruthless-tactics-on-student-debt.html (discussing a company that fights bankruptcy
claims relating to student loans that is very successful in preventing the discharge of most
student loan debt).
129 See Devon Merling, How Bankruptcy Could Help Solve the Student Loan Crisis, DESERET
NEWS (Aug. 23, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/865585172/
how-bankruptcy-could-help-solve-the-student-loan-crisis.html.
130 Austin, supra note 127, at 417. R
131 See id.
132 Id. at 418.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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sale manner would be unlikely to pass in today’s political climate.135
It also would be a significant expense for taxpayers: if any borrower
could discharge his or her student loans in bankruptcy without wait-
ing for twenty-five years, it might lead to mass participation by borrow-
ers.  That is not to say that industry reform is not required, and in fact
it will likely someday be necessary to face the coming education bub-
ble, but the IBR gap must be filled in the short term in order to help
current borrowers.  This is especially true because the current Con-
gress is anemic toward any provisions that result in significantly more
spending for the federal government.
Though the first IBR tax bomb will not occur for many years,
solutions put in place now may still affect current borrower treatment
by the IRS,136 and knowing how the federal government will ulti-
mately treat IBR borrowers will certainly affect borrowers’ financial
planning.137  A solution specifically designed for IBR could be more
narrowly tailored and less costly in its implementation and thus would
be less controversial and more likely to be implemented by Congress.
Since there are already close to two million users of IBR, swiftness of
implementation is key to assure that borrowers that are struggling now
are able to benefit from the eventual solution.
C. A Policy Proposal to Address the Tax Bomb Without
Forgoing Revenue
Though current proposals to fix IBR all have some merit, they
each have implementation issues that make them unlikely to succeed
politically.  A proposal simply adding loan debt forgiven under IBR to
current exclusions in 26 U.S.C. § 108(f) would be simple and not re-
quire any notable overhaul of current procedures.138  While this pro-
posal certainly has appeal for taxpayers currently using IBR, it would
result in a substantial loss of revenue to the federal government.139
While other programs currently allow loan forgiveness to be excluded
from gross income, these programs are targeted at small, discrete sec-
135 Cf. Chris Cillizza, The Least Productive Congress Ever, WASH. POST (July 17, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/07/17/the-least-productive-con
gress-ever/ (discussing that the current Congress is one of the least productive in terms of
the number of laws passed); Morgan Little, Congress Set to Pass Historically Few Laws in 2013,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/11/news/la-pn-con
gress-few-laws-2013-20131211 (focusing on similar legislation numbers).
136 For example, if the IRS began collecting a pro rata portion of the borrowers’ pro-
jected tax liability upon forgiveness as suggested by this Note, the IRS would have to
change its collection tactics for the millions of borrowers already using IBR.
137 See Lieber, supra note 49 (discussing how there are already financial firms that offer R
services to help borrowers on IBR plan their financial future).
138 See Austin, supra note 127, at 417. R
139 See id.
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tions of the population, such as those that work in public service for
ten years after graduating.140
A universal exclusion from gross income for all IBR recipients is
unlikely to come to fruition.141  It also endangers the incentives to
enter government service, education, and other underserved areas
that Congress targeted with existing exemptions;142 making the exclu-
sion available to all does not encourage new graduates to enter any
particular field.  At the same time, while there is significant merit to
Austin’s proposal of allowing loans to be partially discharged in bank-
ruptcy,143 this would require a significant overhaul of laws surround-
ing student loans that may be difficult to reach in the current political
climate.  Additionally, Austin’s proposal covers all student loans, and
not just the borrowers that are using IBR,144 which could result in
even more significant write-offs of student debt by the federal
government.145
This Note proposes a more moderate solution that allows the fed-
eral government to recoup part of the funds being forgiven without
requiring systemic change in the way that student loans are handled
in bankruptcy and without crippling the taxpayer at the point of for-
giveness.  The IRS could treat the amount that would be forgiven at
the end of the twenty-five-year period conceptually similarly to capital
expenditures, prorating the total amount over the twenty-five-year
period.146  However, instead of a percentage of a deduction being al-
lowed each year, a percentage of the projected eventual liability will
be assessed against the borrower.  For the borrower, this means that
there is no single crushing payment but rather manageable install-
ments.  For the federal government, this means that most of the
140 See, e.g., Letter from Eric Solomon, Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy, to Representa-
tive Sander Levin (Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing current loan forgive-
ness programs, such as those for teachers under the Higher Education Act of 1965).
141 Cf. 156 CONG. REC. H7,453–503 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2010) (showing the last activity
on H.R. 2492, a bill to exclude IBR loan forgiveness from gross income: a single sponsor
attaching to the bill in 2010); H.R.2492 – To Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to
Exclude from Gross Income Discharges of Student Loans the Repayment of Which is Income Contin-
gent or Income Based, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-
bill/2492/cosponsors (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (showing no further movement on H.R.
2492 since November 15, 2010).
142 See 153 CONG. REC. H10,255–301 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (stating that public sector
loan forgiveness will allow more people to pursue careers in public service by allowing loan
forgiveness after ten years).
143 Austin, supra note 127, at 417. R
144 See id.
145 Cf. McArdle, supra note 12 (noting that 7% of student loan borrowers are currently R
in default, which suggests that there may be widespread participation in Austin’s proposed
bankruptcy overhaul).
146 See 26 U.S.C. § 68 (2012) (giving guidelines for deductions of capital expenditures
over an item’s class life, a conceptually similar idea to a pro rata contribution of the pro-
jected one-time tax liability).
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money recouped via the old one-time tax liability will be received
years earlier.
For example, if a borrower’s tax liability would be $25,000 at time
of repayment, the borrower could pay $1,000 of additional federal in-
come tax each year for twenty-five years.  From the perspective of the
Treasury, the same amount of money is being received from the bor-
rower as would have been received in the year of forgiveness, though
the money is collected in a way that is significantly friendlier to bor-
rowers.  Currently, borrowers have to plan for the one-time tax liabil-
ity years in advance and save to eventually make the payment.147  This
financial planning is unnecessary for the borrower if the pro rata por-
tion is due on a yearly basis, leading to less risk of improper planning
and the borrower being assessed fines from the IRS for not being able
to pay the liability.148
This solution of pro rata collection of the eventual tax bomb is a
better option for the federal government than simply collecting funds
in year 25 for two reasons.  First, it is likely that many borrowers will
not have the cash on hand to repay the tax bomb amount because the
one-time tax liability will be very large to most borrowers relative to
their income, especially considering that the average user of IBR will
not have a high-paying job.149  A borrower’s potential unpreparedness
for repayment is problematic because the IRS imposes stiff penalties
on taxpayers who do not pay their tax liabilities on time.150  Repay-
ment may be further protracted because even the stiffest penalties
cannot force borrowers to repay money that they do not have, result-
ing in many borrowers having to settle their tax debt over a period of
years, further worsening the impact of loan forgiveness for
borrowers.151
As a result, the repayment to the federal government may end up
coming in years 25 through 30 instead of year 25, for example, or the
government may ultimately only be able to recover a portion of the
borrower’s tax liability, resulting in forgone revenue.  The relative se-
curity of pro rata collection in years 1 through 25 avoids the logistical
headaches associated with collecting a lump sum from borrowers who
may not have properly planned for repayment.  Second, the Treasury
would benefit by receiving the money earlier due to the time value of
147 See Lieber, supra note 49 (discussing how private financial firms are assisting bor- R
rowers using IBR who must plan their financial futures to account for loan forgiveness).
148 See Topic 653 – IRS Notices and Bills, Penalties and Interest Charges, IRS, http://www.irs
.gov/taxtopics/tc653.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
149 Moreover, IBR users who have high-income jobs will also have high student loan
debt loads, or they would not have been eligible for IBR in the first place.
150 See Lieber, supra note 49. R
151 See IRS, THE IRS COLLECTION PROCESS: PUBLICATION 594 (2012), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf.
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money.152  If the Treasury has to take a loss on the loan because of
forgiveness, which it does under the current IBR system, it would be
more beneficial to the federal government if the money is received
before the final year of the plan.
While making this change to IBR, other more minor changes
ought to be made as well, reflecting the need for disclosure-based reg-
ulations in addition to the structural change of pro rata collection. As
part of this proposal, Congress should require the Department of
Education to increase disclosures made to borrowers who are repay-
ing their loans.  Student loan statements currently inform borrowers
not just what their monthly payment is but also how much of the loan
principal has been paid.  In theory, this incentivizes borrowers to
make higher-than-minimum payments: when borrowers see how
much of the minimum payment goes to interest alone, they are incen-
tivized to pay more than the minimum to minimize the cost of the
loan over the course of repayment.153
For users of IBR, student loan statements should state the current
projected loan balance at the time of forgiveness, as well as the pro-
jected tax consequences to the borrower.  In other words, borrowers
should see their total projected tax bomb every month upon receiving
the statements.  Consumer awareness about the one-time tax liability
at the time of loan forgiveness should also be increased, by putting
this information in monthly statements as suggested or clearly indicat-
ing the consequences of IBR to borrowers at the time they sign up for
the payment plan.  This would have two beneficial effects: it would
disincentivize those who do not truly need to be on IBR by demon-
strating the consequence of carrying student loans for twenty-five
years,154 and it would also incentivize those who genuinely need IBR
to make larger-than-minimum payments to the extent that they are
able to minimize the tax fallout from loan forgiveness.
152 See, e.g., A Primer on the Time Value of Money, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS., http://
pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/new_home_page/pvprimer/pvprimer.htm (last visited
Jan. 17, 2015) (“The notion that a dollar today is preferable to a dollar some time in the
future is intuitive enough for most people to grasp without the use of models and
mathematics.”).
153 The idea behind these disclosures is conceptually similar to those used in the credit
card industry as part of the Federal Truth in Lending Act and the Credit CARD Act of
2009. See CARD Act Factsheet, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 2011), http://www
.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2011-factsheet/ (“Each monthly
statement must include how long it will take to pay off the bill and the total cost to the
consumer as a result of paying only the minimum amount due.”).
154 H.R. REP. NO. 113-17, at 77 (2013) (noting that one concern with IBR is the poten-
tial for graduate and professional students with high income to use the program when they
are actually able to repay their loans on a normal repayment schedule).
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D. Mechanical and Conceptual Issues with This Proposal
There are mechanical difficulties in implementing this proposal,
most notably issues relating to the calculating of the pro rata amount
that taxpayers will owe and how to deal with borrowers who elect out
of IBR.155  First, the borrower’s income will change over the course of
twenty-five years, which in turn means that the amount the borrower
will pay using IBR will fluctuate as the borrower’s discretionary in-
come increases or decreases.156  The difficulty here is projecting the
loan forgiveness amount with relative precision.  If a borrower makes
a larger payment due to increased income, the principal of the loan
will be affected, and, as a consequence, the amount forgiven at the
end of the repayment period will change.  Unless the IRS adjusts for
this, projections would assume the same income for twenty-five years,
which would in turn lead to a higher projected tax bomb than will
actually occur and a pro rata payment higher than it ought to be.  Put
simply, the borrower would be paying for a tax liability that, in most
cases, will end up being far lower.
To elaborate, if IRS projections used to calculate the borrower’s
pro rata portion of tax bomb repayment assume that the borrower will
have income of $60,000 for twenty-five years, the projected loan bal-
ance forgiven at year 25 will be significant because discretionary in-
come payments with a salary of $60,000 for the total loan amount of
average debt will barely affect the principal.  However, in the most
likely scenario to occur in reality, the borrower’s salary will increase
over time as he or she receives raises and promotions, which in turn
increases his or her discretionary income and the amount being paid
under IBR.  This results in a smaller projected loan balance that will
be forgiven at the end of the repayment period.
To illustrate, assume a borrower with $60,000 of income and
$125,000 of student loan debt.157  This borrower has partial financial
155 Borrowers are allowed to change their repayment schedule or they may become
ineligible for IBR due to rising income. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(6) (2012).
156 See Income-Driven Plans, supra note 28 (“Your required monthly payment amount R
may increase or decrease if your income . . . changes from year to year.”).
157 This example uses the average indebtedness upon graduation for a law student at a
private university and a median entry-level salary figure. See supra note 33 (stating that the R
average indebtedness for a private law school graduate is $125,000).  The National Associa-
tion for Law Placement (NALP) estimates that the median starting salary for law school
graduates in 2011 was $60,000. See Starting Salaries – Class of 2011, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW
PLACEMENT (Jan. 2013), http://www.nalp.org/starting_salaries_class_of_2011.  While
NALP did not furnish the median salary for 2013, it released data that show the median
salary still hovering around $60,000.  As an important caveat to “average” starting salary
data: the salary distribution for graduates is bimodal, with one end of the distribution at
$160,000—the starting salary at many large law firms, and the other end of the curve be-
tween $40,000 and $65,000—the starting salary at many smaller law firms and public inter-
est organizations. See Salary Distribution Curves – Class of 2013, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW
PLACEMENT, http://www.nalp.org/salarydistrib (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).  Notably, the ad-
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hardship and will have a monthly IBR payment of $534.158  Such a
relatively small monthly payment will not even cover the interest for
the month, and at the end of the repayment period the loan will have
a balance of $253,663.159  If this amount was included in the bor-
rower’s projected gross income for year 25, it would change the bor-
rower’s estimated tax bill from $8,435 to $86,032.160  This would make
the borrower’s tax bomb $77,597,161 and the pro rata share would be
$3,103.162  Compare this to the same borrower profile but with in-
come adjusted upward each year to reflect a raise approximately track-
ing the rate of inflation.  If the borrower’s projected income were
increased by 2% each year during the twenty-five-year period, the pro-
jected tax bomb will be approximately half of the original projection,
because there would be a gradually larger amount being paid each
repayment period.163
justed mean salary of $78,205 only represents 2%–4% of total graduates, and half of all
graduates are in the relatively narrow cluster of $40,000 to $65,000. See id. (“[A]s both the
arithmetic mean and the adjusted mean show, relatively few salaries are close to either
mean.”).  The 18% distribution at $160,000 throws off the mean calculation, artificially
making the average law school employment result better than it actually is.  This is impor-
tant because it demonstrates that the median starting salary number, which is lower, is a
better indicator than the mean for the purpose of modeling real world results.
158 Borrower’s monthly payment assumes borrower is single with no above-the-line
deductions.  To calculate monthly payment: (60,000 − 17,235) × 0.15/12 = 534. Here:
60,000 is the AGI, 17,235 is 150% of the poverty line, 0.15 is for 15% of discretionary
income, and 12 adjusts from annual payment to monthly payment.
159 This is assuming interest compounded monthly, 300 monthly payments, an initial
loan balance of $125,000, and a monthly payment of $534.
160 Calculated using the IRS’s estimated federal withholding calculator, which calcu-
lates a taxpayer’s anticipated tax liability based on input of gross income and above-the-line
deductions (which are 0 here). See Witholding Calculator, IRS, http://apps.irs.gov/app/
withholdingcalculator/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
161 All of the calculations in this Note are modeled in Excel.  The following will re-
create this calculation: =FV(0.0056,300,534,-125000).  This formula represents the out-
standing loan balance at the end of an IBR term starting with the numbers above, using
Excel’s FV function, which measures how payments affect a balance affected by compound
interest over time.  The four variables in this formula are (from left to right): interest rate,
number of payments, monthly payment, and starting balance.  This FV function operates
on a monthly basis.  Federal student loans have an annual interest rate of 6.7%, which
divided by 12 equals 0.0056, the first variable.  For number of payments, there are twelve
payments a year for twenty-five years, yielding 300, the second variable.  The third variable
is the monthly payment, and using the formula discussed earlier, the monthly payment is
$534.  Finally, the fourth variable is the balance, which this Note assumes to be $125,000,
the average for a graduating private law school student.
162 This calculates the taxpayer’s gross income for year 25 at $313,663, or $60,000 +
loan balance forgiven.  The taxpayer’s normal tax liability is subtracted to give the final
amount of the tax bomb.
163 This is due to higher payments reflected by a gradually climbing salary.  Eventually,
the borrower’s payment will be greater than the capitalizing interest and actually decrease
the principal of the loan.  Using Excel to illustrate the proposed fix of pro rata repayment
is more difficult to model due to the changing variables of this alternative.  The model
assumes the borrower’s income will go up at roughly the rate of inflation (1%–3%), in
order to reduce the pro rata amount paid on top of normal tax each year.  The FV func-
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In order to more closely track borrowers’ likely salary increases,
the IRS could use Bureau of Labor statistics to estimate what the aver-
age increase in income over twenty-five years will be for someone in
the borrower’s occupation and age and downwardly adjust the pro-
jected student loan balance forgiveness at the end of the period and
the corresponding tax liability.164  Alternatively, and more simply, the
IRS could assume that the borrower’s income will rise at the rate of
inflation and use that figure to downwardly adjust the borrower’s pro
rata tax liability, which would be less complicated and result in signifi-
cantly lower administrative costs, although it would have the drawback
of understating many borrowers’ future incomes by only adjusting for
cost-of-living increases.  Either one of these solutions would reduce a
borrower’s pro rata contributions in the early years after graduating,
which will presumably be the years when borrowers have the lowest
income of their career.
Second, there are issues with borrowers who begin their repay-
ment on IBR but then transition to the ten-year payment plan when
they have the income to be on a normal repayment schedule and are
no longer eligible for IBR.165  The standard repayment schedule does
not include any tax liability at the end of the repayment period, be-
cause the entire loan balance is paid by the borrower.166  If a borrower
starts out on IBR under this proposal, they would incur pro rata tax
liability based on their projected loan forgiveness at the end of the
repayment period.  Eventually, when the borrower elects to switch to
the normal ten-year repayment plan, the borrower would have paid a
pro rata portion of a tax liability that does not in fact exist.  Congress
could simply pay all the pro rata contribution back to the borrower
during the year that the borrower elects to switch to the standard re-
tion requires all four variables to be the same for the life of the loan.  To fix this, the model
examines each individual year, with the assumption that the borrower’s salary was going up
by 1%–3% each year, an average estimate for inflation in the United States.  That number
is then divided by 12 to break down the yearly payment to monthly payments.  With a 3%
year-over-year salary growth assumption, the ending balance of the loan is $68,000 instead
of $253,000, making the tax bomb go down from $77,000 to $18,000.  With a 2% year-over-
year salary growth assumption, the ending balance of the loan is $138,000, making the tax
bomb $37,000.  With a 1% year-over-year salary growth assumption, the ending balance of
the loan is $199,000, making the tax bomb $58,000.  The pro rata contribution each year
for these loan assumptions would be $720 (3%), $1,480 (2%), and $2,320 (1%), compared
to $3,103 without any assumption of salary growth.  These figures would obviously change
depending on income due to the progressive taxation system, but the estimates illustrate
the ability for salary growth assumption to be a simple and effective fix.
164 See Occupational Employment Statistics: May 2013 National Occupational Employment and
Wage Estimates, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat
.htm (last modified Apr. 1, 2014) (providing wage estimates for select professions).
165 See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(6) (2012).
166 See Repayment Plans, supra note 22 (providing background on the standard ten-year R
repayment plan).
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payment plan.  Congress could also elect to keep a portion of the pro
rata tax liability as a fee for using IBR.167
Third, the proposal’s most significant shortcoming is illustrated
by the preceding discussion regarding the profile of borrowers who
are eligible for IBR and their average debt loads: fixing IBR does little
to fix the more systemic issue of the expense of education and a mis-
match in the degrees that borrowers pursue and degrees that are em-
ployable.  Minimizing initial borrowing is the critical step toward
lessening financial hardship for borrowers, something that reform for
IBR alone are not able to accomplish.
Take the example of a borrower who has an entry-level job salary
around the national average for college graduates in the social sci-
ences and humanities, $38,000, and has undergraduate debt around
the average for IBR users, $26,000.168  This borrower will actually pay
off the loan during year 13, and thus will not have any tax liability that
will result in income from the discharge of indebtedness.169  The key
is responsible loan origination by borrowers and meaningful reforms
to encourage responsible borrowing.  While the tax bomb will cer-
tainly have grave consequences to the taxpayers that it affects, it will
likely only affect the small subset of borrowers that incur large student
loan liabilities relative to the job prospects of their degree.
Accordingly, the borrowers who will be most affected by the tax
bomb are college students who do not graduate;170 professional
school students who incur higher-than-average debt without correlat-
ing higher-than-average starting salaries, such as veterinary171 and law
students;172 and students who receive degrees without significant prac-
167 This could further reduce congressional concerns that borrowers would use IBR
when they do not truly need to in order to reduce the amount they pay.
168 The figure for social sciences and the humanities is used because the average busi-
ness graduate will not be eligible for IBR due to high income. See Salary Survey: Average
Starting Salary for Class of 2013 Grads Increases 2.4 Percent, NAT’L ASS’N OF COLLS. AND EMP’RS
(Sept. 4, 2013), https://naceweb.org/s09042013/salary-survey-average-starting-class-
2013.aspx (providing starting salaries for various disciplines).
169 This borrower will pay off the loan in month 153 of IBR, assuming that the bor-
rower did not lose eligibility at an earlier time due to higher income.
170 Note the special problem of students who attend for-profit colleges but do not
graduate, who often incur vast student loan liabilities relative to their peers at nonprofit
colleges. See John Lauerman, For-Profit College Costs Surpass Nonprofit Peers in U.S. Study,
BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-26/for-
profit-college-costs-surpass-nonprofit-peers-in-u-s-study.html (showing that from 2007–
2008, for-profit schools cost on average $30,900, while public universities cost on average
$15,600).
171 See, e.g., David Segal, The Vet Debt Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2013, at BU1 (providing
an overview of the debt veterinary students can face upon graduation).
172 See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BU1
(providing accounts of the challenges law students face in paying off debt upon gradua-
tion); Jennifer Smith, Crop of New Law Schools Opens Amid a Lawyer Glut, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31,
2013, 8:19 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732392610457827
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tical application, such as unfunded doctoral or masters programs in
the humanities.173  This stresses that the IBR fix is merely a temporary
repair for current borrowers, and systemic reform is necessary in or-
der to align the cost of education to its true value.174  The solution in
this Note is only intended to be a solution for those who have already
borrowed too much for an education with a lackluster outcome.  That
is not to say that a solution for these borrowers is not critical.  Instead,
this proposal ought to form part of the eventual tapestry of fixes
Congress uses to solve the burgeoning student loan crisis.
CONCLUSION
The problems of IBR are a microcosm of the problems of student
loans: a significant amount of borrowers have borrowed too much
from the federal government without a correlating rise in job pros-
pects.  If left unchanged, the statutory gap of 20 U.S.C. § 1098e will
result in vast tax liabilities for millions of borrowers at the end of the
repayment period when the loans are forgiven.  Wholesale exclusion
of the amount discharged from indebtedness is politically unlikely in a
climate that disfavors significant federal expenditures.175  The solu-
tion proposed in this Note achieves both affordability for the bor-
rower and maintains revenue for the federal government by requiring
the borrower to contribute a pro rata amount of the projected tax
liability as part of the borrower’s federal income tax.
At some point in the near future, Congress must engage in a sys-
temic reform of student loans to address the coming crisis.  However,
there are currently millions of borrowers using IBR, and the amount
is only projected to grow.  These borrowers need a retroactive solution
to avoid being further crippled by student loan debt.  Legislative his-
tory reveals that the one-time tax liability was not meticulously de-
signed, and it did not demonstrate any policy goal that Congress was
attempting to achieve with IBR.  Unfortunately, the application of
long-standing federal income tax law to loan forgiveness puts millions
of student borrowers further at risk.  While the first tax bomb will not
be dropped for two decades, reform now is critical to eliminate the
haze of uncertainty surrounding the tax bomb and to restore financial
security to current borrowers.
6301888284108 (illustrating that the problem of too many law school graduates has contin-
ued past the recession).
173 Thomas H. Benton, Graduate School in the Humanities: Just Don’t Go, THE CHRONICLE
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/graduate-school-in-the/
44846 (explaining the disadvantages of graduate school, one of which is debt).
174 See, e.g., Simkovic, supra note 13 (discussing a proposal for risk-based student R
loans).
175 Expenditure here means the amount of income the federal government would
forgo by the exclusion of discharged indebtedness from gross income.
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